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The oft-quoted purpose of the Securities Act of 19331 is to pro-
tect the purchaser of securities through the provision of "full and
fair disclosure ... and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof". 2
* S.B., University of Wisconsin, 1969; J.D., University of Nebraska,
1972; LL.M, Harvard University, 1973. Now associated with Rifkind
& Sterling, Incorporated, Beverly Hills, Calif.
The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Louis
Loss of the Harvard Law School for the many criticisms and valuable
insights which he freely and generously gave to the author. Of course,
Professor Loss is not responsible for nor does he necessarily agree
with the positions taken herein.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act].
2. Preamble, 1933 Act, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74; H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2, 3 (1933), S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
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The 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 which in-
creased the number of beneficiaries of the disclosure requirements,
interact to form a semi-systematic 4 pattern designed to inform5 the
investor 6 of the danger or unfairness of the proposed transaction.
The success of such a system in allowing the investor to protect
himself against the making of bad bargains is dependent upon the
information disclosed being the whole truth.7  The financial state-
ments contained in the issuer's registration statement must be cer-
tified by independent accountants s who have investigated and veri-
fied the financial records of the issuer9 and who will themselves
be liable under section 1110 of the 1933 Act should the registration
statement become effective with financial statements they knew or
should have known were false or incomplete. The investor must,
for the most part, rely on the issuer's word that the remainder of
the registration statement, or the whole of the information dis-
closed in the course of an exempt sale, is true and complete.
The investor's receipt of the whole truth is thus dependent upon
the ability of the issuer to perceive the nature and extent of the
real problems facing it and whether any propensity it might have
to conceal or misrepresent this information is offset by the checks
See generally 1 L. Loss, SEcURIIEs REGULATION 121-128 (2d ed. 1961,
Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1970) [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act].
4. The 1933 Act and 1934 Act, unfortunately, do not act as a single inte-
grated system and are badly in need of codification. See Cohen,
"Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340 (1966). An
effort toward codification is presently well underway. ALI FED. SEC.
CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972); Loss, The American Law Institute's
Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAw. 27 (1969).
5. "[T]here is the recurrent theme throughout these statutes of disclo-
sure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure. Substantive regula-
tion has its limits. But 'The truth shall make you free'." 1 Loss 21.
The disclosure requirement does more than inform the investor, it
also acts as a deterrent to actions which one would not want made
public. See L. BRANDE S, OTFIE PEOPLE'S MONEY (1914).
6. "Investor" is used here to mean, unless the context otherwise re-
quires, any person who is contemplating buying, is offered, is ac-
tually buying, has bought, holds, contemplates selling, offers to sell
or sells the security in question, even for speculative purposes.
7. Even a system of substantive regulation such as that which exists at
the state level and most notably in California, to a large extent must
rely on the issuer's word that the information provided is accurate
and complete.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa(25), (26) 1970; SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210
(1972). See generally L. RAPPAPORT, SEC AccOUNTING PRAcTIcE AND
PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as RAPPAPORT].
9. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 90 (March 1, 1962).
10. 1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
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imposed upon that issuer. These checks include, in addition to the
issuer's own integrity, review of the registration statement by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") and po-
tentially massive liability.:1 Another check is supplied by certain
other persons who may themselves be subject to liability for the
issuer's misdeeds. There is absolute liability on those who offer or
sell a security in violation of section 5.12 Those who offer or sell
or buy a security by means of material misstatements or omissions
are personally liable unless they do not know and have no reason
to know thereof.13 Directors, certain officers of and underwriters
for the issuer are each personally liable under section 1114 for losses
caused by sales based upon a registration statement which they
know to contain material misstatements or omissions unless they
have resigned or disassociated themselves from the issuer and in-
formed the Commission that they would not be responsible. 15 Fur-
ther, their ignorance of such improprieties will not avail them a de-
fense unless they have made a reasonable investigation to discover
them.1
If the investor is to be protected, then where the deterrent ef-
fect of the securities laws upon the issuer and underwriter is not
sufficient, the responsibilities of the other persons involved in the
sale of securities must be increased or additional persons must be
found to accomplish this end. If the underwriter does not make a
reasonable investigation, somebody else must. In connection with
many of the transactions which come under the securities laws,
the lawyer will usually be required, by the terms of the parties'
contract or for the protection of his or her client or others, to give
an opinion that the transaction does not violate the securities laws.
The opinion, which becomes a condition precedent to the consum-
mation of the transaction, is based upon the existence or non-ex-
istence of certain facts. The Commission is now attempting to
hold lawyers to a duty somewhat analogous to that imposed upon
an "expert" by section 11.17 For many years the Commission has
11. 1933 Act §§ 11-12, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-1, q (1970); SEC Rule 10b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
12. 1933 Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
13. 1933 Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
14. 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970).
15. 1933 Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970).
16. Id.
17. 1933 Act § 11(b) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (1970). In SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
f 93, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the Commission unsuccessfully argued that
a lawyer who writes an opinion in connection with the sale of a se-
curity is an "underwriter" of that sale.
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contended that a lawyer has a duty to investigate his client' and
now appears to take the position that if the client has committed
a securities fraud, the lawyer will be liable as an aider and abettor
where the fraud could have been uncovered by a reasonably thor-
ough investigation or where the lawyer was in error as to the law
unless he or she resigns and informs on his or her client.19 The
Commission is thus attempting to transform the attorney into a
legal auditor; the counterpart of the accountant and the practical
equivalent of the Section 11 "expert", whose duty it is to verify
the information given to the public or the facts upon which an
exemption from registration is claimed. This thrust raises impor-
tant questions as to the investor's need for verified information
20
and, if such a need exists, by whom should it be filled and how.
It is the purpose of this article to explore these questions and to
offer an alternative method for supplying the investor with verified
information.
II. NEED FOR VERIFIED INFORMATION
Is there a need for verified information or is such an investi-
gative process unnecessary in light of the Commission's review of
registration statements and the deterrent effects of securities law
liability? In addition to the audit of the financial statements, is
there also a need for an audit of the other information by a person
who, by withholding the necessary certification, could stop a fraud-
ulent transaction before the investor is hurt? In answering these
questions one must remember that the securities laws were de-




18. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962).
19. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C.
filed Feb. 3, 1972). The SEC Complaint for injunctive and other re-
lief is reprinted in full in BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 138 at D-3
(Feb. 9, 1972). See Karmel, Attorney's Securities Laws Liability,
27 Bus. LAW 1155 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Karmel]. Note, At-
torney's Liability-Advising, Abetting, and the SEC's National Stu-
dent Marketing Offensive, 50 TEXAs L. REv. 1265 (1972). See also
Ruder, Wheat & Loss, Standards of Conduct Under the Federal Securi-
ties Acts, 27 Bus. LAW. 75 (Spec. Issue, Feb. 1972); Comment, SEC
Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation,
Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DuKE L. REV. 969 [here-
inafter cited as Comment].
20. The term "verified information" is used here to mean, unless the
context otherwise requires, that information, including facts upon
which an exemption from registration is claimed, the truth and com-
pleteness of which have been borne out by a competent and reason-
ably thorough investigation.
21. 1 Loss 127 (footnote omitted).
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A. TiE NEED FOR PREVENTION
It is, of course, the prevention of frauds and securities act viola-
tions that is the primary concern.22 It is very unlikely that once
an investor has been defrauded he will ever recover the full amount
of his losses. The investor may be reluctant to bring suit espe-
cially if his losses are comparatively small, because of the expense,
time and unpleasantness involved. The proceeds to the investor
of any recovery he is awarded will be reduced by the amount of
attorney's fees. The use of the class action device has made litiga-
tion an economically viable alternative where the individual claims
are small but there are many of them. Class action suits, however,
tend to be protracted, complex and are often settled for a small
fraction of the actual loss.2 3 Moreover, proof of individual claims
may be more expensive than the claim itself is worth.
The investor's loss is likely to extend beyond the price of the
security and there is no provision for recovery of these damages. 24
Because the investor has purchased that particular security, he
has foregone other, possibly profitable, opportunities. If the stock
securities he purchased were used as collateral, their loss of value
might have severe consequences.2 5 In addition, the investor may
later find himself, for unrelated reasons, in financial trouble from
which he might otherwise have been able to extricate himself.
There is also the need to protect the imprudent but by no means
uncommon investor who, counting his profits before the returns
are in, financially overextends himself.
To be sure, some of those investors who would be the most se-
verely injured by these losses may be protected by stricter enforce-
ment of suitability rules.26 Nevertheless, the point remains that
22. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 567
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
23. See, e.g., In re Four Seasons Securities Law Litigation, BNA SEC.
REG. & L. REP. No. 183 at A-12 (Jan. 3, 1973) (W.D. Okla.). Judge
Thomsen approved settlement for 8% ($8,000,000) of the claims be-
cause of the protracted and complex nature of the case and because
there were few solvent defendants.
24. Consequential damages are recoverable where the plaintiff can es-
tablish "the causal nexus with a good deal of certainty." Zeller v.
Bogue Electric Manufacturing Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. %[ 93,903
(2d Cir. 1973) at 93,623. This type of consequential damages includes
money spent to investigate the issuer before purchase of its shares,
beyond this, the strict causation requirement will make recovery
very difficult.
25. Cf. SEC Rule 144(h), 37 Fed. Reg. 596 (1972).
26. E.g. CCII NASD MANUAL art. HI, § 2, I 2152. For a discussion of
proposed additional suitability rules for the sale of the securities of
an unseasoned issuer, see NASD, Notice to Members 73:17 (Mar.
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much of any investor's loss will never be recouped. Moreover, the
loss extends beyond the individual investor and his family. The
economy suffers from the resultant misallocation of capital re-
sources as does the honest enterprise to which that capital might
otherwise have gone.
B. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
A brief sketch of the requirements for a registration statement
and the procedure involved in processing it may be helpful in more
fully understanding the amount of protection this process can af-
ford the investor. 27 Each registration statement in addition to
meeting certain general requirements 28 must be prepared accord-
ing to the proper form29 which is usually Form S-1. 30 The thirty-
two classes of information and documents required solicit what
might be called the primary disclosures. In addition to producing
a portrait of the issuer and the details of the proposed sale, probes
are sent into the classic areas of unfairness such as transactions be-
tween the issuer and its affiliates. The form also requires that the
issuer submit, as exhibits, copies of its articles of incorporation,
by-laws and other documents including material contracts and the
opinion of counsel as to the legality of the issue under state law.
Rule 40831 solicits what might be called secondary disclosures:
"such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to
make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading."
The registration statement is processed at the Commission by
one of the branches of the Corporate Finance Division. Each
branch consists of security analysts, accountants, examiners and
attorneys and has available for consultation a corps of experts in-
cluding statisticians, engineers, geologists and valuation specialists.
The branch is often familiar with the particular industry in which
the issuer operates and with the typical problems that face mem-
bers of that industry. The information supplied by the issuer is
matched against this knowledge to check for deficiencies. The reg-
istration statement is also checked against the financial statements
and the exhibits for internal consistency. If the registration state-
ment is clearly deficient, the Commission might "bedbug" it, i.e.,
14, 1973). The suitability rules are designed to prevent investors
from taking on risks greater than they are able to reasonably bear.
27. See 1 Loss 272-283.
28. SEC Reg. C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400, -. 494 (1972).
29. Id.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1972).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1972).
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send it back without comment, or if it suspects fraud, open an
investigation. Most often, however, the Commission will send a
letter of comment, suggesting that certain changes, usually in em-
phasis, be made. If the issuer does not comply with these com-
ments, the Commission may refuse acceleration3 2 or issue a stop
order,8 3 either of which would be fatal to most offerings. Be-
cause of the length of time involved, judicial review is of little
use, and for all practical purposes the Commission has final say.
The examination has its limits. Although the Commission has
the power to make field investigations, such investigations, par-
tially because of the limited number of personnel, are rare. The
Commission does have copies of officers' employment contracts, la-
bor contracts, supply contracts, franchises, etc. which verify or
contradict the claims made or indicate problems not mentioned in
the registration statement. And if the issuer makes a positive
statement, e.g., that it is the largest in terms of sales in its indus-
try, the Commission can and often does ask for verification. If,
however, the registration statement is internally consistent and
a misstatement or omission cannot be deduced from the documents
submitted, that misstatement or omission will probably go unde-
tected. The Commission must in these circumstances rely heavily
upon the issuer's word and the deterrent effect of the securities
laws. While the requirement that primary disclosures must be
made makes omissions in that area more difficult, although not
impossible, outright lies and misrepresentations may go undetected.
Even harder to detect would be omissions in the area of secondary
disclosures. How likely is it that the Commission would discover
that a major customer which is a close corporation is in financial
trouble or that a material setback has been suffered on a research
program? Their knowledge in such cases may be wholly depend-
ent on the fortuity of an anonymous tip.
In addition to the requirements of the 1933 Act, any issuer who
applies for the listing of any class of its security on a national se-
curities exchange34 or who has more than one million dollars in
gross assets and a class of equity security held by 500 or more
persons3 5 must also file a Form 10 registration statement 36 with
the Commission. Those issuers and any issuer who has had a pub-
lic offering within the year 37 must also file annual and other pe-
32. 1933 Act § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1970).
33. 1933 Act §§ 8(b), (d); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b) (d) (1970).
34. 1934 Act § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
35. 1934 Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (1972).
37. 1934 Act § 15 (d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970).
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riodic reports,38 definitive copies of their proxy material 9 and cer-
tain informational reports. 40 These reports, except for the proxy
material, are not sent to the shareholder although they are public
information. The Commission's review of these Form 10 registra-
tion statements, annual and periodic reports, and proxy material is
similar in nature to that given registration statements filed pur-
suant to the 1933 Act and is therefore subject to many of the same
limitations. Because there are a great number of filing require-
ments under the 1934 Act the Commission does, however, have the
advantage of being able to cross check these filings one against the
others.
With some exceptions,4 1 most notably a public offering pursuant
to Regulation A,42 there is no requirement that the Commission ever
be informed of sales exempt from registration, much less review
the disclosures made in connection with those sales. In the case
of many of the securities so issued, the fraud will be completed
and the damage done before the 1934 Act reporting requirements
are applicable. Although the Commission has the power to and
does investigate, and, if it believes warranted, will sue for an in-
junction, it must first have some knowledge of the transaction and
its illegal nature. Unfortunately, such knowledge may come only
sporadically and in the form of investor complaints, anonymous
tips and perhaps even suspicious newspaper advertisements.
The Commission does perform a very valuable service to in-
vestors by making sure that the material information of which it
38. 1934 Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970). The most commonly used
forms are SEC Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1972) (current re-
ports); SEC Form 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (1972) (quarterly re-
ports); and SEC Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1972) (annual
reports).
39. SEC Rule 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1972). A person making a
request for tender of the securities of reporting companies must also
file a report if that person would beneficially own more than five
per cent of that security after consummation of the transaction.
SEC Rule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1970).
40. E.g. SEC Form 3, 17 C.F.R. § 249.103 (1972) (initial statement of
beneficial ownership of securities).
41. The Commission must be notified of sales made pursuant to SEC
Rule 144, 37 Fed. Reg. 596 (1972). Notification would also be re-
quired, with certain exceptions, under proposed SEC Rule 146(h),
37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26141 (1972).
42. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263. If the offering is over $50,000, a notifica-
tion on SEC Form 1-A, 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (1972), containing an
offering circular must be filed with the appropriate SEC regional of-
fice. SEC Rule 255, 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (1972). Regulation A, in ef-
fect, is not an exemption but rather is a less burdensome form of
registration. See generally 1 Loss 619-625.
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is aware is so positioned, emphasized and explained in the pro-
spectus or proxy that the investor who reads the prospectus or
proxy will be made aware of that information and fully compre-
hend its meaning. The presence of the Commission and its energy
in themselves reduce the patency, if not the amount, of fraud by
increasing the risks perceived by those who contemplate trans-
gression. The vast majority of registration statements and other
documents filed with the Commission are submitted in good faith.
Yet, in a small number of cases, blatantly fraudulent registration
statements such as that of BarChris Construction Company 43 will
be filed and become effective. The Commission cannot catch all
securities sinners. In that respect its problems are not unlike any
other enforcement agency's.
C. THE DETERRENT EFFECT
The securities acts subject those who violate its provisions to
heavy civil and moderate criminal liabilities. This "in terrorem"
liability extends beyond the boundaries of corporate form to en-
compass controlling persons, certain officers, directors, underwrit-
ers, sellers and others. The deterrent effect of all criminal laws
has been seriously questioned; deterrence appears to be a function
of the perceived likelihood of being caught and prosecuted as much
as the amount of the penalty.44 Those who are outright swindlers
usually believe they will not be caught. Moreover, criminal prose-
cution for securities fraud is usually reserved for the most gross
abuses. In most cases the Commission will use the injunctive proc-
ess, which carries quasi-criminal consequences. 45 Civil liability is
the main threat, and prospect of personally having to refund a
multimillion dollar stock issue is indeed frightening.
There are several factors, however, which either lessen or coun-
teract this deterrent effect. The primary factor is the seemingly
limitless optimism of the entrepreneur.46 Because the measure
43. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Cf. SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 197 at
A-6 (April 11, 1973) (C.D. Cal.).
44. See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRnMvNAL SANCTION(1968).
45. E.g. 1934 Act § 15(b) (5) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (c) (1970) (giv-
ing the Commission power to revoke the registration of a broker
who is enjoined); and SEC Rules of Practice 2(e) (3) (i) (a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(e) (3) (i) (a) (1972) (giving the Commission power to sus-
pend, without a hearing, the privilege of practicing before it).
46. THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIEs MARKETS OF TME
SECURIS AmD EXCHANGE ComvnsIoN, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 514 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
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of liability is basically the amount of the decrease in price of the
security from the public offering price,47 the issuer and others
subject to liability have little to fear if the price of that security
increases. Similarly, most of the injunctions sought by the Com-
mission against officers and directors of an issuer have been in the
wake of financial debacles. Most entrepreneurs are highly op-
timistic by nature. Generally, most have a large personal stake in
the outcome of their enterprise and are thoroughly convinced that
it will prosper. This assuredness of future prosperity-if enough
capital can be raised-may lead him or her in his or her efforts to
convince the underwriter or investor of the desirability of sharing
in his or her venture by putting up the necessary capital, to con-
sciously overstate the potential of that venture and either to ignore
potential problems or dismiss them as trifling. This natural op-
timism and years of training to "think positive" may have a
subtler effect: they may condition the entrepreneur psychologically
to filter out negative input, making it impossible for him or her
to realistically view or describe the enterprise.
The deterrent effect of civil liability is further counteracted
when, combined with this overly optimistic view, the issuer per-
ceives the information in question to be sensitive. The issuer may
be perfectly willing to tell all to the investors but balk at disclos-
ing that information to competitors or labor unions. 48 The infor-
mation might also concern another corporation on which the is-
suer is to some degree dependent, and who can assert some pres-
sure on the issuer not to disclose. The issuer may, for example,
have confidential information that one of its substantial customers,
a close corporation, is beginning to have serious financial trouble
and that the customer has submitted false financial statements to
its other creditors. The issuer, while believing that the customer
might survive if it is given time to recover, knows that failure
of that customer would have a material effect on the issuer's sales
and earnings. The issuer will be extremely reluctant to make a
disclosure which might very well precipitate that failure. Simi-
larly, an issuer whose business depends on a license may be re-
luctant to make certain disclosure about its licenser, especially if
that license easily could be terminated. This type of situation is
made more difficult when an officer of such a customer or licenser
sits on the issuer's board of directors.
47. 1933 Act §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-I (1970).
48. SEC Rule 485, 17 C.F.R. § 230.485 (1972), does provide for confidential
treatment and non-disclosure if the Commission determines that dis-
closure is not necessary for the protection of investors. However,
an application for confidential treatment is rarely granted.
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In cases such as the case of the troubled customer above, where
there is a possibility of the occurrence of an event which would
have a material adverse effect on the issuer, that probability must
be disclosed if it is "material".49 One verbal formulation of the
concept of materiality, used in the context of measuring the mate-
riality of facts relating to the possibility of an event, is a balance
of
both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the
company activity.5 0
This formulation is probably similar to the intuitive calculation
made by the entrepreneur in his decision of what information, if
any, should be disclosed to the investor. But the same optimism
which makes objectivity so difficult may lead an entrepreneur who
is aware that there is some possibility of a devastating event, to
undervalue the probability that that event will occur. Moreover,
the entrepreneur may have the feeling that if his or her enter-
prise should ever fail, it will not be caused by the happening of
that event. Even for those actions in which causation is not an
element, 51 the necessary element of materiality may prove difficult
if that event never did occur or occurred years later. The en-
trepreneur's biased, unrealistic, misrepresented belief in the non-
occurrence of that event turned out to be correct. In this case the
benefit of hindsight works for the defendant.
Management may also consciously choose to take the risk of vio-
lating the securities laws when it is desperate for new capital.
The seemingly far off possibility of a law suit may be a small de-
terrent to one who sees his or her job or company in immediate
danger. Indeed, few risks might seem too great to be taken to save
a corporation which that person has spent much of his or her life
building.
To be sure, these factors do not operate to the same degree on
all of the officers and directors subject to liability under section 11.
Persons named as about to become directors and "outside" directors
are more capable of objectivity and, having a much smaller stake
in the enterprise, are less likely to be willing to risk a law suit.
On the other hand, although they are required to be diligent in
their investigation of the company, their vigor still may be lulled
by an enthusiastic and confident management. Where the director
is on the board because of his skill as a scientist or technical expert,
49. Cf. SEC Rule 408, 17 C.F.R. 230.408 (1972).
50. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
51. See 6 Loss 3880-83.
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he may not only be incompetent to investigate the non-technical
aspects of the company but may also be unaware of the scope of
his responsibility under the securities laws as well. Many corpo-
rations do not have outside directors. The Federal Securities Code
would make a valuable contribution by allowing the court to dif-
ferentiate between standards to be applied to the inside and out-
side -directors.52 Until the courts do discriminate between inside
and outside directors, it is understandable that those who are
aware of the responsibility and potential liability involved are re-
luctant to become directors.53 This is salutary in that the investor
does not rely on the prestigious name of a director who will not
direct, but, at the same time, any positive force such a director
might provide is lost. In deciding whether to become a director, a
person is well advised to consult with his own attorney and, if
feasible, to have his own attorney conduct a due diligence investi-
gation before the company publicly sells its securities.
Aside from the accountants and other experts, the section 11
party most likely to be objective and to induce full disclosure is the
underwriter. The underwriter is in a position 54 to make a thorough
investigation of the issuer. The underwriter's personnel and
counsel generally should have the necessary knowledge of finance,
accounting, general business matters and law to make a compe-
tent investigation. Unfortunately, this potential is not always ac-
tualized. In its Special Study, the Commission found that while
some of the older, more established investment banking firms
conducted a very careful due diligence investigation,
many of the newer underwriters were lax in performing their
responsibilities to investigate issuers whose securities they intended
to sell to the public.5 5
Many of these newer firms lacked experience and were often not
familiar with the "complex controls governing underwriting."5 6
Of the 503 underwriters who managed offerings of the common
stock of an "unseasoned" issuer in 1961, 135 had no one on their
staff with at least five years' experience and 57 had no one with
52. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1403 (f) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1973).
53. See, e.g., Courts Faulted on Directorships, N.Y. Times, April 7, 1973,
at 43, col. 1. For a humorous but insightful account of the plight of
a corporation seeking an outside director, see Farrell & Murphy,
Comments on the Theme: "Why Should Anyone Want to Be a Di-
rector?", 27 Bus. LAw. 7 (Spec. Issue Feb., 1972).
54. "Only the underwriter and the accountant are free to assume an ad-
verse role. . . ." Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68
COLum. L. RaV. 1411, 1421 (1968).
55. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 514.
56. Id.
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more than two years' experience.5 7 Of those 503 firms surveyed
in 1961, 146 had nobody with over two years' experience.58 The
capital commitment of the newer firms was "usually minimal;"
many were virtually judgment proof "and therefore less im-
pressed by the sanctions of section 11." 59  Of that same 503
firms, 104 had an adjusted net capital of less than $10,000.60
The Special Study was published five years before Escott v.
BarChris Construction Corp.6 ' was decided. That case held, inter
alia, that underwriters had a duty to investigate and could not
merely rely on the word of management. Predictably, conditions
improved after that decision. However, as a result of its Public
Investigation in the Matter of the Hot Issue Securities Markets,62
the Commission concluded that some underwriters still do not
conduct reasonable investigations. 63  Moreover, there is a wide
disparity as to the quality of due diligence investigations con-
ducted by underwriters.6 4  This variation and uncertainty as to
what is required further serves to lessen investor protection. 5
The underwriter's lack of due diligence in the investigation of
its clients may result from factors other than incompetence or in-
difference to civil liability. The underwriter might think it un-
necessary or may be unwilling to question the word of a gentle-
man, especially in this industry which relies so heavily upon
trust. The underwriter himself also may be overly optimistic and
may not be immune to the feelings of optimism projected by the
issuer and may thus relegate the investigation to a lower priority
on its busy time schedule. Above this, while the underwriter is
in some sense adverse to the issuer, it is hardly disinterested. There
is, of course, the profit to be made from that underwriting. More
than this, the number of underwritings managed by a particular
underwriter is a source of prestige and a calling card for participa-
tion in the syndication of underwritings managed by other firms.66
On the other hand, issues which are not successfully sold not
only negate those effects but also make it more difficult to form
57. Id. at 612.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 514.
60. Id. at 612.
61. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275, 37 Fed. Reg. 16011 (Aug. 9,
1972) [hereinafter cited as HOT IssuE INVEsTiGAEON].
63. Id. at 16012.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Hayes, Investment Banking: Power Structure in Flux, 49 HA v. Bus.
REv. 136, 146 (March-April, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Hayes].
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syndicates for future issues as well. Salesmen may, particularly
in a hot issue market, put considerable pressure upon an under-
writer to supply them with additional securities to sell. This is
strong incentive for the underwriter to resolve any doubts in its
own favor.
As a result of the Commission's Hot Issue Investigation, the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) commendably
has proposed new rules and amendments to its Rules of Fair Prac-
tice. The proposed new rule67 would require the managing
underwriter to establish and maintain its own written policy of
due diligence investigation procedures. The minimum procedure
would consist of fourteen areas of investigation (fifteen in the
case of tax-sheltered programs) and the maintenance of adequate
records documenting that investigation. In addition, the manag-
ing underwriter would have to certify in the underwriting agree-
ment, or, if none, in the Prospectus that such an investigation
has been duly performed.6 8  The NASD would also require that
each member which is engaged in underwriting have a "Qualified
Underwriter Principal"6 9 (QUP) who would be responsible for
organization and supervision of the member's participation in that
underwriting. The QUP would be required to have at last three
years' experience and pass an examination designed to test com-
petency in "(1) accounting and financial analysis; (2) regula-
tions of the Commission and NASD pertaining to securities distribu-
tions; and (3) preparation of registration statements. '70 The QUP
would thus have the necessary experience and expertise to conduct
the required due diligence investigation and to integrate the re-
sults of the investigation into the registration statement.
There is much to recommend strongly the passage of these
proposed rules. The extent of the investigation required by section
11 is uncertain; courts can only assess the investigation made
by the underwriter with the benefit of hindsight and may lack
the expertise to set out specific, affirmative standards for such
an investigation. The rules would set out uniform guidelines for
such an investigation. Another contribution, of no less import-
ance, is that the rules would affirm and give a positive definition
67. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 35, NASD Notice to Members
No. 73:17 (March 14, 1973) at 9. The proposed rule is set forth in an
appendix to this article.
68. Id.
69. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. I, § 2(d) Sch. "C" (4), NASD Notice
to Members No. 73:17 (Mar. 14, 1973) at 14. This proposal is set
forth in an appendix to this article.
70. Id.
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to the investigative role of the underwriter. Moreover, respon-
sibility for supervision of that investigation would be placed upon
specific qualified individuals.
There are, however, areas where the numerous requirements
of the rules could be extended profitably. The rule would re-
quire that the underwriter give "consideration to the necessity" of
hiring an outside consultant to conduct portions of the investiga-
tion where the issuer is a "promotional organization or en-
gaged in maketing high technology or previously unmarketed
products. ' 71 The utilization of a knowledgeable consultant in
such circumstances would seem to be essential to an effective in-
vestigation. The QUP, if ignorant of the specific problems and
pitfalls of a particular industry or situation, would not only not
know what to look for but also would be unable to evaluate
what he or she actually did find as well. Accordingly, the use of
an outside consultant who is an expert in the issuer's field should
be made mandatory under those circumstances, at least when no
member of the underwriter's staff has the requisite expertise.
The first item of investigation merely requires "Er]eview by
the underwriters' counsel of the issuer's corporate charter, by-laws,
and corporate minutes.172 The review required should be more
extensive; it should be a complete legal audit, which would include
review of the stock book, all contracts of the issuer with its man-
agement and affiliates, and all other material contracts, leases
and franchises. The underwriter's review might also be ex-
panded to include reasonable inquiries into the status of other
corporations, if any, upon whom the issuer is dependent in terms
of sales, backlog, supply or sub-contracting. Inquiry into the is-
suer's relations with its employees might also be appropriate.
A more fundamental criticism is that there is little guidance as
to the extent and intensity of "review" or inspection necessary.
While it is difficult to formulate what is basically a definition of
reasonableness, especially in circumstances which may differ so
greatly, certain procedures might be suggested. An inspection of
the issuer's files might be appropriate with respect to a specific
area which has not otherwise been documented. To further
assure a more comprehensive investigation, NASD also might re-
quire that the member's written general investigative procedure
be kept on file with the NASD or with the Commission and that a
summary of the investigation carried out with respect to a partic-
ular registration be filed with the registration statement as an
71. Id. art. I, § 35(a) (8).
72. Id. § 35(a) (1).
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exhibit at least when the company is in the "promotional, de-
velopmental or exploratory" category.73
These rules, if passed, may add another arrow to the quiver of
investor causes of action. The investor will have a cause of action
against the NASD should the NASD fail to be reasonably dili-
gent in enforcing the rules. 74 On the other hand, the status of the
availability of private causes of action against NASD members for
failure to comply with NASD rules is not clear.7 5 In one circuit,
apparently, a private right of action exists for a violation of any
rule of the NASD which is designed to prevent fraud.7 6 In other
circuits, the decisive issue is likely to be whether the NASD rule
is a substitute for a rule of the Commission 77 (upon which there
is clearly a cause of action). The importance of verification in the
prevention of fraud and the fact that the Commission, after its in-
vestigation, requested the NASD to promulgate these rules indi-
cates that they may well be a substitute for direct regulation by the
Commission. While this additional cause of action may offer lit-
tle extra coverage beyond section 11 and Rule 10b-5, the rules may
well serve to define the reasonable investigation required by sec-
tion 11. A violation of the rules by itself may be the basis for a
10b-5 action.7 8
The actual effect of the proposed rules is uncertain. The rules
proposed by the NASD will not negative the underwriter's, es-
pecially the managing underwriter's, incentives to violate the se-
curities laws. Moreover, the person with final authority to decide
whether that risk should be taken may not be the QUP. While the
rules state that the QUP shall be responsible for the "organization
and/or supervision," the certification is made by "the underwriter"
and the person who conducted the investigation may not have
control over whether that certification is given.79 This is not to
fault the rules; perhaps the only way to overcome the incentive to
violate the securities laws is to put the investigation-and power
73. Cf. Testimony of Howard D. Sterling, Esq., HOT IssuE INVESTIGATION,
supra note 62, Mar. 6, 1972. Mr. Sterling also points out that failure
of the underwriter to perform a due diligence investigation may be in
itself a material fact which must be disclosed.
74. Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944).
75. Comment, supra note 19.
76. SEC v. First Securities Co. of Chicago, 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972).
77. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
78. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AN MAMMALs ON CORPORATE
FiNANCE 1088 (1972).
79. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 35 (c), supra note 67, at 12.
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of certification-in the hands of someone who does not face those
temptations.
The liability for fraudulent sales of securities does not by any
means end with section 11. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and Rule
10b-5 impose liability upon those "sellers" who sell by misrepre-
sentation or omission. The courts have defined "seller" to mean
not only those who pass title but also agents and aiders and abet-
tors as well.8 0 While this liability may deter the seller from
making additional misrepresentations, in most cases of a registered
offering the seller will be too far removed from the issuer to act
as a check upon the issuer. The dealer or selling group member is
also not free from temptation. The selling concession may com-
prise as much as sixty per cent of the underwriting spread and a
successful selling effort may be doubly important to a selling
group member who wishes a participation as an underwriter in
the manager's next syndicate.8 1
The liability for material misrepresenations or omissions im-
posed under sections 11 and 12(2) is to a degree-dependent upon
the extent to which negligence is equivalent to fraud-duplicated
by Rule 10b-5. 82 Notwithstanding the procedural advantages 83 of
an action on Rule 10b-5, because the coverage is largely duplica-
tive, it is doubtful that Rule 10b-5 provides much of an additional
deterrent in that area. This is in contrast to the role of Rule 10b-5
as the major deterrent in the area of corporate reports, interim
disclosures and insider trading. It is likewise in doubt how much
extra deterrent is provided by state common law and blue sky lia-
bilities.8 4
The results of the Special Study and the Hot Issue Investiga-
tion lead to the conclusion that investigation and verification of in-
formation are the key to the prevention of fraud and the protec-
tion of the investor. The underwriter bears primary responsibility
for perfecting this protection. Investigative practices vary
widely between underwriters and between underwritings. It may
80. E.g. SEC v. North American Research & Development Corp., 424
F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970). See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities
Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto,
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
81. Hayes, supra note 66, at 144.
82. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). But see 6 Loss
3886-88.
83. Possibly including a longer statute of limitations. But see 6 Loss
3898-900.
84. A state blue sky commissioner might refuse to permit sales in that
state if the terms of the offering were unfair. E.g. UnFoRm SEc.
AcT § 306 (a); CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 25140 (West 1973).
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be that the underwriter's investigation which would be required
by the new NASD rule is an adequate balance of investor protec-
tion and burden upon business. However, this still leaves the in-
vestor dependent on the conscience and competence of the indi-
vidual underwriter. Within the guidelines the underwriter may
still be lax in its investigation, too readily satisfied with incom-
plete answers, and may semi-consciously close its eyes to problems.
To the extent that the protection afforded by the underwriter's in-
vestigation proves to be inadequate, the question becomes how
much more protection reasonably can be given to investors and
by whom.
III. LAWYER AS AUDITOR?
A. THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER
The lawyer, unlike the underwriter, is not free to be adverse to
his or her client. The lawyer's duty to "represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law"8 5 is not limited to a trial
setting. The lawyer who negotiates for his client or who repre-
sents his client before an administrative agency must also be a
zealous advocate, seeking to advance the lawful objectives of his
client. In addition to arguing those inferences of fact and con-
structions of law which would allow the client to prevail, the law-
yer should make full use of his skills in advocacy and bargaining
to advance the client's cause. Nor is the duty of zealous represen-
tation limited to advocacy. As an advisor, the lawyer should "ex-
ert his best efforts to insure that the decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant consid-
erations."86  The lawyer should not only inform the client of all
relevant legal considerations but also should give his client the
benefits of his other knowledge and experience as well. As a
planner, the lawyer should do his best either to structure the
transaction for the client so that it complies with the law and
still accomplishes the client's objectives, or arrange or construct
the legal framework through which the client's objectives may be
accomplished.
The role of the securities counsel representing his client in a
setting other than litigation is a complex one. He or she must act
as independent expert, planner, advisor, negotiator, draftsman,
and advocate, sometimes simultaneously. Simply stated, the law-
85. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSISIITY, CANON No. 7 [hereinafter
cited as CPR].
86. CPR, ETHICAL CoNsIDERToN 7-8 [Ethical Consideration hereinafter
cited as EC].
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yer's realistic goal is to assist the client in complying with the se-
curities laws and minimize the extent to which those laws inter-
fere with the client's legitimate objectives. In essence, the lawyer
must match his or her client's legitimate objectives and needs
against the requirements of the securities laws. Where they con-
flict, the lawyer should ascertain and counsel minimum compliance
or, if possible and necessary, abortion of the transaction. This
function is made difficult by the securities laws' complexity and
their lack of predictability.8 7
In a registration statement the client expects the lawyer to
maximize the value of the Prospectus as both an insurance policy
against future liability and as a selling document in addition to
getting the registration through the Commission. The issuer wishes
to hold negative or sensitive disclosures down to the absolute min-
imum, and the underwriter also wants a Prospectus that will be
most useful to the salesman. "Within the bounds of the law" the
lawyer should use his skills as planner, draftsman, negotiator,
and advocate to accomplish these goals.88
The securities laws require that all material information con-
cerning the issuer and the transaction be disclosed fully to the in-
vestor. While in most cases the materiality or non-materiality of
a particular fact or item of information will be clear, in other
cases it may present a difficult factual question on which reasonable
minds will differ. Where the issue of materiality is unclear and
the disclosure of the information may be detrimental to other le-
gitimate interests of the client, the lawyer should explain the
87. SEC, DiscLosuREs TO INrESTORS: A REAPPRAiSAL OF FEDRa AnDiNv-
ISTRAT=V PoIacIEs UNDER THE '33 AND '34 AcTs at 56 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as THE WHEAT REPORT].
88. This '"maximization" is coming under increasing criticism.
In at least some instances, what has developed in lieu of the
open disclosure envisioned by the Congress is a literary art
form calculated to communicate as little of the essential in-
formation as possible while exuding an air of total candor.
Masters of this medium utilize turgid prose to enshroud the
occasional critical revelation in a morass of dull, and-to all
but the sophisticates-useless financial and historical data. In
the face of such obfuscatory tactics the common investor is
almost as much at the mercy of the issuer as was his pre-SEC
parent. He cannot by reading the prospectus discern the
merit of the offering.
Feit v. Leasco Data, 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The
lawyer's leeway in this area may depend on the "degree" of ma-
teriality of the item in question and whether it is a general business
risk. Compare Feit v. Leasco Data (clouded disclosure of $100,000,000
of assets of acquired company in acquisition insufficient) with Hoh-
man v. Packard Instrument Co., 471 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1973) (clouded
disclosure of risks of new product development held not misleading).
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uncertainty and the risk to the client who must decide whether
the item is to be included. If the client decides not to include
the fact or item of information, the lawyer should abide by that
decision if he or she can do so in good conscience.
Because of the expense involved and for other legitimate rea-
sons the client may wish to sell securities without registration.
The issuer's objective is to raise the needed capital with as much
latitude as possible without violating the securities laws. The
client might also be, technically, a controlling person of the is-
suer8 1 who is unwilling to register his or her shares.9 0 The law-
yer's job is to find a way that the shares may be legally sold.
The securities laws were designed to protect the investor with
the least possible interference with honest business.9 1 The law
must function to provide safeguards to the investor rather than
to frustrate legitimate and socially desireable objectives. Where
the objectives are legitimate, it is the lawyer's "positive duty to
show the client how to avail himself to the full of what the law
permits. '92
The counselor's 'duty does not end with his responsibilities to his
client. The lawyer is also responsible to society both as a lawyer
and as a citizen. Morover, the responsibility of the lawyer when
he counsels a client is morally, if not legally, greater by virtue of
his or her influence over the future conduct of the client. The law-
yer as counselor may be faced with many situations in which diffi-
cult ethical questions arise. Unfortunately, very little attention
89. "Controlling persons" are deemed "issuers" for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the person who sold the security for the controlling
person is an underwriter and therefore destroying the section 4(1)
exemption. 1933 Act §§ 2(11), 4(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(11), 77d(1)
(1970). A "control person" or "affiliate" is circularly defined as
"a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermedi-
aries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with,
the person specified." SEC Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1972).
The Federal Securities Code would eliminate the considerable uncer-
tainty of operating under such concepts, by requiring that all persons
who sell more than $100,000 of the security in other than a limited
offering (counterpart to the present non-public offering exemption)
must file a "distribution statement." ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 227, 228,
253, 509 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1972). The concept of control would, how-
ever, be retained for other purposes, but certainty would be aided by
rebuttable presumptions.
90. The Federal Securities Code would provide for registration by the
issuer on demand of the shareholder unless waived by the share-
holder. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 501(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
91. 1 Loss 127 (footnote omitted).
92. CPR, EC 7-1, n.6 (footnote omitted) (referring to a tax lawyer).
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has been given by the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
to the responsibilities of the lawyer to society and to the involved
individuals in his or her role of giving an opinion. Indeed, if at-
tention may be measured by the amount of writing on a subject,
the scholars in the field of legal ethics virtually have ignored the
lawyer's responsibilities in connections with his or her opinion un-
til the matter was in the courts with two prestigious law firms ac-
cused of aiding and abetting the allegedly illegal and fraudulent
conduct of their clients.93
B. LAWYER'S DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
A distinction should be drawn between the duty not to ignore
obvious indications that a statement is false and the duty to investi-
gate. If there are obvious indications that the client's statements
are false the lawyer cannot close his or her eyes to those indica-
tions; such conduct is and should be tantamount to the knowledge
required for the imposition of aider and abettor liability.94 To
have knowledge of a fact in this sense does not require that one be
absolutely certain that the fact exists. In a criminal prosecution
where knowledge is an element of the offense, such as aiding and
abetting, "such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that
it does not exist."95 It is just as culpable to purposely avoid hav-
ing knowledge as it is to have the knowledge itself. If a person
has observed or been informed of those facts which constitute
that high probability of the existence of another fact, he or she is
93. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil Action No. 225-72(D.D.C. filed Feb. 3, 1972). Note 19 supra. The Canons of Ethics
require that a lawyer not engage in conduct which he or she knows
to be illegal. CPR, DR 7-102 (a) (7). The lawyer is also required to
disclose the fraudulent conduct of clients in the course of representa-
tion if the lawyer cannot convince the client to rectify the fraud.
CPR, DR 7-102(b). However, the force of these provisions has been
diluted by the opinions of the Bar. ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Opinions, Nos. 287 (1953) and 314 (1965). The Bar may be
unwilling to enforce even these diluted standards. See Comment,
supra note 19, at 975. While the Commission may disbar a lawyer for
unethical conduct, SEC Rules of Practice 2(e) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2
(e) (1) (1972), the procedure is clumsy. See Comment, supra note
19. Moreover, many of the formal rules of evidence, especially the
hearsay rules, apply, and the limits on review of administrative
agency determinations may not be applicable as this is not an area
of administrative expertise. Kivitz v. SEC, [1972-1973 Transfer Bind-
er] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 93,746 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
94. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
95. United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 n.4 (1972), citing MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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said to have knowledge although it cannot be proven that he or
she drew the obvious ultimate conclusion. Thus in SEC v. Frank,9 6
the lawyer would have been found to have knowledge of the
falsity if he had received information which he "could readily
understand" and which indicated that "high probability" of the
falsity regardless of whether he actually concluded that it was
false. This is an equation with knowledge rather than an action-
able duty of reasonable care and it is no less applicable to a law-
yer than it is to anybody else.97
Once a lawyer has knowledge or its equivalent that a statement
in a registration statement or offering circular is false or mislead-
ing, the lawyer proceeds at his or her peril. If the lawyer files
the registration statement or offering circular without making
sufficient further inquiry so as to reasonably and in good faith
satisfy himself or herself that the statement is in fact true and
not misleading, the lawyer will properly be liable as an aider and
abettor if the statement was actually false or misleading. The ex-
tent of that inquiry will, of course, vary with the circumstances,
but should probably include some independent verification.
From a practical point of view, the inquiry should continue until
enough substantive information supporting the truth of the state-
ment is amassed to not only satisfy the lawyer that the statement
is true but also to convince a jury that it was more likely than
not that the lawyer actually, reasonably, and in good faith did, in
fact, believe that the statement was true as well.
In the course of preparing a registration statement, the lawyer
will have to gather certain information and documents concerning
the issue. Part of this information to which the lawyer cannot
shut his or her eyes, includes the contents of the articles of in-
corporation, by-laws, material contracts and other documents
which the lawyer must father and file as exhibits.9 8  Failure to
look at these documents which constitute part of the registration
statement, if not to read them, should be recklessness. If the con-
tents of these documents or the lack of documents, especially the
material contracts, indicate a high probability of the falsity of a
statement in the main document which should correspond but does
not, the lawyer should be found to have "knowledge". Thus, if
the issuer is a manfuacturer and the Prospectus falsely states that
the issuer's only product is manufactured pursuant to an exclu-
sive license and that contract, included in the exhibits filed with
96. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
97. Id. at 489.
98. E.g. SEC Form S-1, Item 31(b), 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1972).
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the Commission, is captioned "NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE," it
would be difficult to believe that the lawyer did not actually know
of the false statement in the Prospectus or if the lawyer did not
know that he or she did not recklessly avoid knowing. The re-
sult should be different if, conversely, the contract were captioned
"LICENSE"and there is a provision buried in the contract which
could make the license non-exclusive under certain circumstances,
which the lawyer negligently overlooked as he or she skimmed
over the contract. The distinction is one of kind rather than de-
gree, although it may blur somewhat in the practical application of
the recklessness standard. The concept of recklessness marks
somewhat of a departure from strict notions of scienter. The
departure is necessary because of the difficulty of proving knowl-
edge and the policy that disfavors avoiding knowledge. The Fed-
eral Securities Code would impose aider and abettor liability for
persons who have "knowledge." 99
An independent duty to investigate is the duty to independ-
ently verify information supplied by the client and to seek out ad-
ditional information regardless of whether there is any indication
whatsoever that the information supplied by the client may be
false, misleading or incomplete. A duty to investigate could be
directly imposed or indirectly imposed by removing the require-
ment of knowledge for aider and abettor liability. The latter
course would be unfortunate. If such a duty of investigation is to
be imposed it should be imposed directly and without confusing
or torturing other legal doctrines.
There is nothing in the CPR that requires the lawyer to inves-
tigate the client for the benefit of third parties. To be sure, the
lawyer has the duty to represent the client competently, which
may include conducting an investigation of the client where that
investigation is part of the client's legal or contractual investiga-
tion or necessary to establish a defense. That investigation is,
however, made at the client's request. A lawyer represents,
rather than inspects, the client. Hence, the CPR provides that
where a lawyer is asked by the client to aid in the development
and preservation of evidence of the client's state of mind and the
lawyer is uncertain as to whether that state of mind actually ex-
ists, "he should resolve reasonable doubts in favor of his clients."'10 0
99. ALl FED. Ssc. CoD. § 1418(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2 1973). The
"reason to know" language contained in that section was included by
error. Conversation with Professor Louis Loss at the Harvard Law
School, May 21, 1973.
100. CPR, EC 7-6. It might seem that in this respect lawyers are held to a
lower standard than stockbrokers who are required to "know" their
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The question is whether it should be the lawyer's obligation
to insure that the investor receives verified information. 10 In
this regard, it is relevant to consider the distinction between the
lawyer and the accountant. As Karmel 0 2 correctly points out,
the communications with the accountant are not privileged, the
accountant must be independent and is an "expert" for purposes of
section 11 liability. The client's confidential communications with
the lawyer are privileged; the lawyer need not be independent
and Congress did not choose to include the lawyer as an "expert"
for section 11 purposes. The differences are more fundamental
than these. The obligations of the independent public accountant
are owed primarily to the public rather than to the client whom
the accountant inspects and audits rather than represents. The
accountant approaches a company under no pretense of allegiance
to it; he or she is there to prepare an opinion, based on standard-
ized criteria on which the public may rely.10 3
The opinion of the accountant may not be given without a rea-
sonable investigation which goes beyond the records of the client.
The accountant must observe the inventories and confirm the
receivables where the amount of those assets is material.10 4  If
such an investigation cannot be made, the accountant may be un-
able to give an opinion. According to the Commission, the major
purpose of the audit is to discover fraud and the accountant is
direeted to employ a high degree of "vigilance, inquisitiveness and
analysis" in that regard. 10 5 "If the accountant is not satisfied
with the results of his examination, he should not issue an af-
firmative opinion"'1 6 and a negative opinion ("nothing has come to
my attention") is not acceptable.' 07
The lawyer is basically an advocate for his or her client. The
lawyer leaves the advocate's posture when he or she gives an
opinion. The opinion should be consistent with the lawyer's best
customers. New York Stock Exchange Rule 405. See also SEC Rule
15b10-5, 17 C.R.F. § 240.15b-10-5 (1972). However, the know-your-
customer rule is the result of the stockbroker's inherent conflict of in-
terest with the customer whom the stockbroker serves as both a
fiduciary adviser and a salesman. The rule is to protect the client
from the stockbroker, not the public from the client. The lawyer
has a duty to the client to understand the client's legal problems but
this duty is not owed to third persons.
101. See note 19 supra.
102. Karmel, supra note 19, at 1163.
103. RAPPAPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5 at 8.
104. Id.
105. Id. ch. 5 at 9 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. ch. 24 at 47.
107. Id. ch. 24 at 46.
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estimate of what the state of the law is and will be liable for neg-
ligence to persons who foreseeably relied upon the opinion. How-
ever, there is an element of trust in the attorney-client relation-
ship. The most important purpose of the lawyer's participation is
not to look to discover a fraud that most likely will not be
present. It is to put forward the legitimate interests of the client.
Must the lawyer also conduct an independent, vigilant investiga-
tion to discover fraud and not give an opinion until he or she
has been personally satisfied after that thorough investigation that
the facts are as the client states and that there is no fraud?
The Commission has stated its opinion and that it is not proper
for a "responsible" lawyer
to furnish an opinion concerning the availability of an exemption
from registration under the Securities Act for a contemplated
distribution unless such counsel [has himself] carefully examined
all of the relevent circumstances and satisfied [himself] to the
extent possible, that the contemplated offering is, in fact, not a
part of unlawful distribution. 08 (Emphasis added).
Further, according to the Commission, where the lawyer knows
that his or her opinion will be relied on as the "basis of a substan-
tial distribution of unregistered securities," and he furnishes an
opinion based solely on facts which he or she has made no attempt
to verify, "a serious question arises as to the propriety of his pro-
fessional conduct."'1 9 This goes too far. It is correct to the extent
that a lawyer should not give a hypothetical opinion without
clearly indicating that it is hypothetical. Where, however, the
opinion clearly indicates that it expresses no opinion as to the
"facts" recited therein, it is difficult to see how such an "opinion"
could be relied on as to those "facts".
The hypothetical opinion does serve a useful function. Where
the opinion is intended for the client's information or where both
the client and the addressee of the opinion are familiar with the
basic facts, an opinion as to the legal consequences of those facts is
all that is necessary. There should be no need to force the client
to pay the extra expense of an investigation. If the person re-
questing the opinion is not familiar with the "facts" and wishes
some assurance that the facts are as stated, that person should not
accept a hypothetical opinion or any opinion which is not based
upon a reasonable investigation. If the brokers will not accept
hypothetical opinions-and they should not unless they are confi-
dent of the facts-the client will have to request an opinion based
on a reasonable investigation and that investigation will have to be
108. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445, 27 Fed. Reg. 1251 (1962).
109. Id.
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conducted. Obviously, if an opinion recites that it is based on a
reasonable investigation when in fact it is not, that would be ac-
tionable negligence" 0 in a lawsuit by the broker against the law-
yer. Moreover, an opinion which implies that it was based on a
reasonable investigation e.g., "to the best of our knowledge"'
should be held to the standard of reasonable investigation. The im-
propriety is not in the giving of a hypothetical opinion but in its
use.
There should be little doubt that the Commission is quite correct
in its position that a lawyer who knows or recklessly avoids know-
ing of a plan for an illegal distribution and who furnishes an opin-
ion to aid that distribution is an aider and abettor regardless of
whether the opinion recites the facts as hypothetical or recites
that it is for the client's personal use only and not to be used as
the basis for a distribution of unregistered stock. The Commission
is also properly concerned over the lawyers who, knowing that they
will not be aiders and abettors if they do not have "knowledge"
and knowing that the client has not provided them with damning
information the ignoring of which would constitute recklessness,
cheerfully accept their fee not caring in the least whether the
client is lying or whether an illegal distribution of securities based
upon the hypothetical opinion is about to take place. It is one
thing to say that a lawyer is not an investigative arm of the Com-
mission and quite another thing to say that he or she may happily
allow himself or herself to be "seized upon as an unwitting
tool"." 2 Is the injury caused by these types of hypothetical opin-
ions compelling enough to force the alteration of the role of the
lawyer by placing upon him or her an affirmative duty to investi-
gate?
The injury caused by such opinions will decline, if it has not
already, by virtue of the broker's increasing reluctance to accept,
much less rely upon, a hypothetical opinion as the basis of an un-
registered distribution. What was perhaps the most potent source
of injury was removed by the repeal of Rule 133 which allowed se-
curities obtained in a merger transaction to be sold without reg-
istration." 3 The sale of unregistered securities is not conditioned
110. Cf. Reamer v. Kessler, 233 Md. 311, 196 A.2d 896 (1964) (attorney
failure to investigate for real estate opinion was negligence).
111. Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions-An Attempt to Bring
Some Order out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. LAW. 915, 922 (1973).
112. Cf. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
113. SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 240.133 (1971) was rescinded effective
Jan. 1, 1973. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, 37 Fed. Reg.
23631 (1972).
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upon the receipt of an opinion and such sales are made without
such opinions. The opinion has no effect upon the civil strict lia-
bility imposed upon the broker and the person for whom the secur-
ities are sold if that sale violates section 5 of the 1933 Act.1 1 4 Civil
liability may be an ineffective deterrent against those who are
judgment proof or who set out to swindle. These people use the
opinion defensively in a criminal prosecution against them to
establish good faith and a lack of knowledge of the illegality of
the distribution. If the opinion clearly states that it expresses no
opinion as to the truth of the "facts" recited, it should hardly
serve a violator in his or her efforts to evade the law. To be sure,
if the opinion does not clearly disavow certification of the facts,
the defendant might successfully argue that he or she believed the
opinion did certify the truth of the facts. This situation should be
rare, however, because lawyers are usually quite careful in limit-
ing their opinions. It would seem, on balance, that the potential in-
jury is not sufficient to justify so drastic a change in the role of the
lawyer.
The lawyer's opinion required for a registration statement is
limited to the legality of the securities under state corporate law 1 5
and does not pass on the law or facts of the securities offering un-
der the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The lawyer is not an "expert" for
section 11 liability purposes. The opinion is not a part of the Pro-
spectus but rather is included in the exhibits. The investor does
not rely on the lawyer for assurance that all material information
is included in the Prospectus. However, the lawyer is obligated
to aid the officers, directors, or underwriter in establishing their
due diligence defense. Moreover, the terms of the contract between
the issuer and the underwriter will normally call for the de-
livery of an opinion by the issuer's counsel to the underwriters
that the issuer is in compliance with the securities laws. Similar
opinions are required in mergers and "tender offers". The Com-
mission, apparently aware that there is no duty to investigate con-
templated by the present securities laws, 1 6 has and probably will
continue to focus on the opinion as a means of regulating the
lawyer's conduct and to enlist the aid of the Bar in enforcing the
securities laws.
To what investigative standard should the lawyer be held when
114. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
115. SEC Form S-1, Item 31 (b).
116. SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fm. SEC.
L. REP. 93, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., Civil Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 3, 1972). National
Student Marketing does not involve the duty to investigate.
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he or she gives an opinion? The personal-satisfaction-after-vigor-
ous-independent-investigation standard is not the standard upon
which most opinions are based. In most cases opinions as to factual
matters are given after a reasonable investigation which for most
purposes includes only an examination of the documents required
to be filed as exhibits and the minutes and stock books of the cor-
poration. Counsel will usually send a questionnaire to officers
and directors but for the most part will rely upon the answers
given by management. There is no legal requirement that an in-
dependent audit be made. While this examination of documents
may certainly uncover improprieties, many will go undiscovered.
For the management intentionally seeking to defraud investors
it may be relatively easy to falsify the minutes, stock book or ma-
terial contracts to hide the fraud.
In most cases it will not be feasible for the lawyer to do more
than examine the exhibit documents, the minute and stock books.
While in many cases the lawyer will visit the premises or at least
the main offices or plant of the issuer, he or she will usually not be
competent to do such things as appraise the conditions of the is-
suer's machinery or assess the more technical aspects of the is-
suer's business. It would be impractical for the lawyer to at-
tempt to go behind every contract to verify that it is what it pur-
ports to be. In most cases the registration statement is handled
by special counsel, unfamiliar with the issuer. The lawyer must
use his or her time efficiently and for the most part this means of-
fice rather than field work. Travel time is largely wasted
time. In a very real sense, it would be a waste of valuable re-
sources to force the lawyer to do the extra leg work.
The lawyer who does vigorously investigate the client and satis-
fies himself as to compliance can only further the legitimate goals
of the client, except perhaps the client's of keeping fees to a mini-
mum.1 17  Many lawyers do make a vigorous investigation aimed
at discovering improprieties and will not proceed with the offer-
ing or transaction, much less give an opinion, unless they are
convinced that the client is telling the truth. The vigor of the in-
vestigation may be motivated by several factors. The lawyer may
be very sensitive to the extent of the injury upon investors that
117. The client may be expected to vigorously object when he or she is
informed that a significant portion of the legal fees were incurred in
the investigation of his or her honesty, a fact which most clients be-
lieve should be beyond question. Client's remarks such as "I thought
you were on my side" indicate the resentment present when a person
whom the client believed to be his or her advocate now appears to
be a policeman.
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could be caused by securities frauds. The lawyer may also be sen-
sitive to his or her own possible exposure to liability which may
run in the several hundreds of thousands of dollars or more. The
lawyer may wish to protect his or her reputation from the damage
caused by association with a fraudulent transaction. Some lawyers
believe that the Commission keeps a "list" of the lawyers it can trust
and another "list" of those which it cannot trust. Many lawyers
jealously guard their image with the Commission.
However, even the most diligent of lawyers obviously can do
only so much and will still have to rely heavily upon the docu-
ments and the word of the management in many areas. Time pres-
sures, geography and the technical complexity of the operation
may frustrate attempts at further investigation. Moreover, the
personal satisfaction standard is impossible to enforce under the
present laws because the main vehicle of that enforcement, aider
and abettor liability, is predicated upon knowledge or recklessly
avoiding knowledge of the fraud. Private enforcement is based
on negligence which presently encompasses only a reasonable
investigation rather than an audit and which in any event, is diffi-
cult to prove. The Commission itself phrased its warning in ethical
rather than legal terms.
The Commission might promulgate a rule requiring that an
opinion of counsel based on an independent audit be included
in the registration statement. Such an audit would be impractical.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether this comes within the scope of the
Commission's authority over the securities bar and whether the
Commission has the power to supersede the CPR. It is understand-
able that the Commission would hesitate to undertake the complex
task of substantively regulating the securities bar. Such an opin-
ion would also have the effect of making the lawyer an "expert"
for section 11 purposes and "expertising" the Prospectus thereby
placing a much lower standard on the other parties to the regis-
tration. It would also have the effect of significantly reducing the
already declining number of lawyers willing to practice in the se-
curities areas. The fees the lawyers who do practice in the secur-
ities areas will increase significantly both because of the extra li-
ability and because of the supply of securities lawyers will di-
minsh while the demand remains constant. If there are fewer
lawyers doing the same total amount of work, the increasing time
pressures will tend to lessen the effectiveness of an audit which
is already impractical. Such a rule would also be unfair to the ad-
vocate and to the client.
To summarize, while the lawyer has no independent duty to in-
vestigate, a reasonable investigation of the client may have to be
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made as the factual basis for an opinion. As a crude rule of thumb,
a reasonable investigation should not force the lawyer out of the of-
fice except, perhaps, for an initial visit to the registrant's facilities
if the lawyer is drafting a registration statement. Because of
the impracticability of the audit, the law should find reasonable
an investigation limited to those documents which the client
must bring into the office. For a registration statement this would
include the articles of incorporation, by-laws, material contracts
required as exhibits, and the minute and stock books. For an opin-
ion that the seller is not a control person, a reasonable investiga-
tion should include little more than examination of the issuer's
last prospectus or annual report or, if none, telephone or written
inquiries of the issuer. If special counsel is to give an opinion that
the offer and sale is exempt under Section 4(2) from the registra-
tion requirement, the law should not require more than an inspec-
tion of the corporate documents, the disclosure document if there
is one and inquiries of his or her client. The lawyer cannot rea-
sonably supervise offers and sales in the field. If, in any of these
transactions, the lawyer is put on notice that something is amiss,
the investigation must continue.
In short, although the audit is the key to the prevention of
fraud, realistically, the lawyer is not the one to undertake it. The
conflicting interests probably would force a dilution of zeal in the
representation as well as the audit. As the Commission has pointed
out, the lawyer is not independent but is the client's "advisor,
defender, advocate and confidant [and] enters into a personal rela-
tionship in which his principal concern is with the rights and in-
terests of the client."11 8 The Commission decided that it did not
want lawyers to make the accounting audit but rather would re-
quire "for the benefit of public investors the detached objectivity
of a disinterested person.""19 This case of the securities audit
involves similar considerations. If such an audit is to be made, its
value to investors should be maximized. This will not be the case
if it is performed by a lawyer who is not independent, and, in
many non-legal areas, is incompetent to make such an investiga-
tion.1 20  To maximize its value to investors, the audit should be
performed by an independent person and upon standards similar
to those of the accounting profession.
118. American Finance Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962), quoted in Karmel,
supra note 19.
119. Id.
120. In addition to the lawyer's lack of non-legal expertise, the securities
lawyer often lacks the expertise and facilities for investigation pos-
sessed by the trial lawyer.
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IV. THE INDEPENDENT SECURITIES AUDITOR
A. THE B=FITs
The Special Study and the Hot Issue Investigation quite clearly
point out the need for a more thorough and effective investiga-
tion of the issue, especially in a first-time public offering. The
proposed NASD rules would, if passed, aid in the fulfillment of
this need. But they would not sufficiently fulfill the need for sev-
eral reasons. The underwriter has conflicting interests, a natural
tendency to rely on the issuer's word, and the understandable lack
of objectivity on the part of someone who has already decided in
favor of the issuer. All of these factors tend to cause a premature
resolution of doubts in favor of the issuer, thereby preventing a
thorough investigation, the essence of which is to follow up on the
leads provided by the inconsistencies. If the issuer's enterprise
involves highly sophisticated technology or is otherwise one of
great complexity, the underwriter may not have anyone on its staff
capable of making the investigation and might not seek the serv-
ices of an expert in that field. More fundamentally, it may be dif-
ficult to condition psychologically as professional auditors per-
sons with a salesman's orientation. And, unfortunately, the temp-
tation to purposely leave a few ugly stones unturned still remains.
This temptation would probably have its greatest effect on the
small, new entrants into the industry who may be undeterred by
the prospect of civil liability, willing to take additional risks to es-
tablish a reputation as an effective distributor. The underwriter
might also be anxious to establish a reputation among prospec-
tive issuers that the underwriter is "easy to get along with."
In light of this, the benefits of the "detached objectivity of
disinterested persons" would be substantial. If such an investi-
gation is to be made, its value to the investor should be maximized.
This could be accomplished by requiring that the investigation
be made by a competent independent person in accordance with
specific standards which would be set out. Such a person might
be called an Independent Securities Auditor (ISA). The ISA would
be required to certify that he or she properly had performed the
investigation and to report whether he or she finds the statements
in the registration statement to be accurate and complete. This
would have the primary effect of assuring that the investigation
had in fact been carried out. It would also do much to assure that
the investigation was thorough. Because there would be uniform
standards for the investigation the investor would be able to more
fully understand the value and limitations of the protection af-
forded in any particular transaction. The quality of the investi-
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gation would, to a large degree, be independent of the quality of
the underwriter. Not only would the temptation not to investigate
be removed from the underwriter but it also might find that hir-
ing an ISA with an established reputation for tough investigating
would be advantageous as a selling point.
The need for the ISA is especially acute in a parent-subsidiary
merger or other transaction where the same interest is on both
sides. In such a situation the independent investigation is neces-
sary to assure fairness as well as proper disclosure. In England,
when a merger or take-over offer is not completely at arm's length,
the City Code directs that "it is essential that competent outside
advice be obtained in order to ensure, and to satisfy offeree share-
holders, that their interests are fully protected.' 1 2 1  Many cor-
porations in this country, do, in these circumstances, seek appraisals
from their investment banker. Because the valuation process
involves a series of largely subjective judgments, it becomes im-
portant that the person making those estimates is independent.
The investment banker might be reluctant to risk losing or hope to
acquire the future business of the corporation and rather than dis-
please the corporation, might consciously or unconsciously tend to
resolve the many uncertainties in the corporation's favor. The
ISA would possess the necessary independence and expertise to
make a valuation in which the investor would have greater confi-
dence.
The coming inclusion of forecasts in disclosure documents also
intensifies the need for the ISA. In England, when a forecast is
included in the disclosure document, the outside advisor, if one is
required for the transaction, must also "report" on the forecast.122
This makes eminent good sense. The value of a forecast depends,
obviously, on the validity of the external and internal assumptions
made by management. A small change in these assumptions could
induce a large change in the bottom-line figure of the forecast.
It is, therefore, critical that the validity of these assumptions be
verified to the extent possible. Moreover, the ISA would have the
expertise to determine whether the estimates made from the un-
derlying assumptions were reasonable. This 'determination by
the ISA that the internal assumptions were accurate and that the
estimates therefrom were reasonable may also prove invaluable
121. THE PANEL ON MER(GE S, CITY WORKING PARTY, THE CITY CODE ON
TAKE-ovms AND MERGERs, RULE No. 4 (3d ed. rev. Feb. 1972). The
City Code is a statement of business ethics and does not have the
force of law.
122, Id, RULE No. 7.
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to the corporation if the forecast is later challenged as not having
been made in good faith.
The investor would also benefit from the increased quality as
well as the increased quantity of the disclosure. Because the
ISA would have to report that the information in the Prospectus
or other disclosure document was not misleading and is set out as
clearly as possible, the investor may be more able to understand
the significance of the disclosures in the Prospectus. The ISA
would be required to assure that specific problems are fully set out
and explained. Such a problem might otherwise be concealed
within a general "no assurance" clause which because of its gen-
erality and because it has become boilerplate, does not allow the
investor to intelligently weigh the risks connected with the prob-
lem. For example, if the issuer had some indications that one of
its new products would not be accepted in the market, the ISA
would not favorably report on a Prospectus which merely stated
that "there can be no assurance that the Company will be able to
successfully market its products." The ISA, closer to the trans-
action, would be able to discover some of these inadequate dis-
closures which the Commission might otherwise have missed.
The concept of the ISA would prove to be more efficient as well
as more useful to the investor. There is a certain inefficiency, if
not illogic, in the requirement that several unconnected investiga-
tions be made. Certain officers, the directors and the underwriters
each must make an investigation to earn their due diligence de-
fense. The lawyer also, in certain cases, must make an investiga-
tion. These investigations do not necessarily compliment each
other. An issuer who intends to defraud or mislead the in-
vestor is likely to choose the underwriter and lawyer whom it
believes will perform only the most minimal investigation. If
nobody makes an effective investigation the value of the investi-
gation requirement is negative as the investor may rely on the in-
vestigation actually having been made; whereas if he or she
knew that there was no investigation made, he or she might be more
skeptical. If everybody makes an effective investigation, there is
expensive and unnecessary duplication. The most likely situation
is that everybody makes a superficial investigation. One thorough,
in-depth investigation would afford greater protection to the in-
vestor. If each party does make a thorough investigation, the one
thorough investigation would be more efficient.
One of the goals of the law is to provide the certainty necessary
for people to regulate their primary conduct in accordance with the
law and so that people know what they may legally expect from
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others. 1 23  Similarly, certainty is crucial in complex transactions
so that people may know what is to be done by them and what is
to be done by others. As Professor Loss observed generally about
the securities laws, "There simply is not enough predictability in
this field."'1 24 The due diligence standard is too vague to allow peo-
ple to know what is expected of them. By careful definition of
the role of the ISA, the task of investigation would be centralized
and performed in accordance with explicit standards. Each of the
parties should be entitled to rely on the results of the investigation
of the ISA as they are allowed to rely on the independent account-
ants, i.e., unless they have reason to know otherwise. This divi-
sion of labor should benefit all concerned. The directors, officers,
underwriters and lawyers would then be able to direct their ef-
forts to those areas in which they are most efficient. The investor
would be benefited by the increased effectiveness of the investi-
gatory process and the higher quality of the disclosures. The
Commission, as its confidence in the ISA grows, would be able to
make greater use of cursory review procedures thereby reducing
the burden upon their already overworked staff and substantially
reducing the waiting period between filing and effectiveness.
The value of an independent investigation, especially of highly
complex issues, has been recognized by a few underwriters who
have hired independent consultants to do all or part of their due
diligence. As a representative of such an underwriter testified
before the Commission:
Our experience has shown that in addition to our own evaluation
of companies, plants, products, and management and in addition
to the due diligence exercised by leading attorneys and accountants,
it is extremely desirable to supplement this work by the use of
independent experts and specialists in the individual fields which
constitute the business of the prospective issuer. We feel that no
investment banking firm can expect to maintain on its staff the
people who would be qualified to properly and in-depth evaluate
the broad spectrum of companies which come before it for fi-
nancing. We also feel that the objectivity of an independent eval-
uation provides a balance to an internal staff member's point of
view.125
B. THE CosTs
Most of this discussion has been in terms of the possibilities of
123. Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RuTGEis L. REV. 11, 59 (1969).
"There must be some sort of security of transactions .... " Id.
124. Proceedings of the Conference on Codification of the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 805 (1967), quoted in THE WHEAT
REPORT, supra note 87, at 56.
125. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275, 37 Fed. Reg. 16011, 16013 n.22
(1972).
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violation of the securities laws. While the potential for violation
is great, many issuers, underwriters, lawyers and accountants obey
the law. Fraud does not run rampant in the area. It would be
difficult to measure the actual level of compliance. Many of the
misleading statements made in the Prospectus may go undiscovered
if they do not cause the subsequent decline in the issuer's securities.
The number of cases reported alleging fraud in the sale of securi-
ties would overstate the level of compliance because many of
these cases may be settled before they are brought to trial. More-
over, when a major fraud does occur, investor losses may run into
the tens of millions of dollars. 126
The benefits of the ISA would still outweigh the costs even if
the level of fraud is relatively low. The use of the ISA would
raise the quality and quantity of disclosure above what is now
the minimum level. The uniformity in the investigation and the
report thereof would allow the investor to have a more realistic
confidence in the information with which he or she is provided.
The likelihood of the occurrence of a major fraud would be greatly
reduced.
The benefits to the financial community would also be sub-
stantial. The issuer and the underwriter would both benefit from
the increased confidence in the disclosure mechanisms of the stock
market. In many offerings the diligence of the parties is above
that required by section 11. In these cases the underwriter might
make a full investigation itself or hire an independent consultant;
the underwriter's counsel may perform an extensive legal audit;
the issuer's counsel may do the same; some of the outside directors
may hire their own counsel, probably at the issuer's expense,
to conduct a separate investigation. In this situation, even though
the lawyers should still examine the legal documents, the cost of
a single thorough ISA investigation maay be less than the cost of
several investigations. The in-depth investigation of the ISA
would also probably be of at least equal, if not greater value, to
the investor.
The ISA concept would also benefit the issuer by making it
easier to attract outside directors. Each director would be enti-
tled to rely on the results of the ISA investigation unless he or she
had reason to know otherwise. Under the present law, which is
coming under increasing criticism, the outside diretor is largely
126. Cf. SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 197
at A-6 (April 11, 1973) (D.C. Cal.). The court ordered the appoint-
ment of a "Special Investigator" to oversee the investigation and the
accounting.
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responsible for his or her own investigation. Because of this and
the large amount of potential liability, many qualified people
have refused positions as outside directors. Some of this reluctance
might be overcome if the potential liability is limited to frauds of
which the director has reason to know.
The Commission has been reluctant to allow "positive" dis-
closures in the Prospectus. Even with the coming inclusion of
forecasts, it might be difficult for the investor to differentiate the
different shades of doom of which the text foretells. Perhaps the
primary reason for this is that positive disclosures are difficult for
the Commission to verify. The ISA investigation would accomplish
this verification and the verified positive disclosure should be al-
lowed into the Prospectus. This would benefit both the under-
writer and the issuer by making it easier to sell the stock. It
would also benefit the investor who would be able to make a
more useful comparison among issuers and by preventing issuers
from hiding specific problems under the cloak of a general "no as-
surance" caveat. This would also benefit the economy as a whole
because the increased comparability would aid in the allocation of
capital to its most efficient uses.
The cost of the ISA investigation would also be offset by the
ability of the issuer, underwriters and their counsel to make im-
portant decisions on the basis of increased factual input. The
benefit of this information may extend beyond the context of the
present securities offering. The ISA investigation might turn up
problems of which the issuer itself was unaware or might discover
the causes of problems with which the issuer is presently trying
to cope.
The issuer and underwriter would also benefit from the de-
creased waiting period between filing and effectiveness. Gen-
erally this period runs between forty-five and sixty days or longer
if more than one amendment is required. As the Commission's
confidence in the ISA grows, it should be more willing to make use
of the cursory review procedures in which case the registration
statement could become effective upon expiration of the twenty-
day statutory minimum or even sooner if the parties wish and the
Commission is willing to accelerate the effectiveness. 1 27 If the of-
fering were for $10,000,000 the time value of that money at six per
cent is approximately $50,000 per month. The decrease in lag
time may in itself justify the I&A fee to the issuer. Moreover, the
investor is also able to put his or her money "to work" earlier.
127. 1933 Act § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1970); SEC Rule 460, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.460 (1972).
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This also benefits the underwriter and the issuer in that they will
have to bear the risk of a disastrous downturn in the market for a
shorter time period.128  This is altogether proper as the market
risk should be on the investor who has already made his or her
decision to buy but is waiting for the registration statement to be-
come effective. The benefits to all concerned would appear to
greatly outweigh the costs. If we are serious in wanting verified
information, the ISA is a bargain.
C. Tm ISA
Implementation of the ISA concept would require the exist-
ence of a readily available source of people competent to perform
the investigation and, in non-arm's length transactions, the valua-
tion. The ranks of business consultants, analysts and other busi-
ness school graduates should provide such a source. For some
time now, the business and financial community has availed itself
of the services of consultants to identify and solve problems.
Much of this work has involved investigation in the field. The di-
verse areas of expertise possessed by different business consult-
ants, analysts, and other business school graduates should enable
the selection of an ISA qualified to investigate almost any aspect
of any business. What has essentially been a service to manage-
ment would now be harnessed for the benefit of the investor.
An effective selective process would, of course, be essential.
This selection process could be accomplished partially by the use of
an examination similar to that proposed by the NASD for the QUP.
Because the investigation of corporations in complex and high
technology industries requires a knowledge of that industry, the
examination should also test that knowledge on the part of appli-
cants who wish to work in those areas. The examination should
be vigorous as the investor would be largely dependent upon the
competence of the ISA. The standards of moral character should
also be very high. The job carries with it a tremendous amount of
responsibility and only the most fit morally and the most compe-
tent should be entrusted with that responsibility.
The job of the ISA would utilize present skills in a new func-
tion. Because this function is new there is a tremendous amount
of flexibility; obstacles such as tradition and the otherwise politi-
128. Most underwriting contracts have "market out" clauses which allow
the underwriter to escape from his commitment if there is a signifi-
cant adverse change in market conditions. Underwriters are hesitant
to make use of this provision, however, because of the effect on their
reputation.
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cally necessary grandfather clauses are absent. The Commission
could utilize the ISA to do the necessary jobs which it cannot do.
Thus, the rules under which the ISA would operate could be tai-
lored expressly to the needs which it would fulfill. For instance, it
could be required that the ISA submit his or her report to the
Commission regardless of whether the offering was withdrawn.
The ISA could also be put under a continuing duty of disclosure.
It is, of course, also essential that the ISA be completely disin-
terested and independent. The standards of independence should
be at least as strict as those of the accountant. The ISA must
have no financial interest whatsoever in the issuer, its affiliates,
or the underwriter. The ISA also must have no affiliation with
any officer, director or controlling person of the issuer, its affili-
ates or the underwriter.
The process of selection of the particular ISA for the underwrit-
ing might present an obstacle in the way of complete independence.
If the ISA is to be chosen by the issuer or underwriter, the ISA
might be under pressure to accede to their wishes or prematurely
resolve doubts in their favor. The ISA might have an eye on being
selected for the next underwriting by the underwriter or issuer.
However, hopefully the underwriter will realize that it is to its
advantage to choose an ISA who has the reputation for tough, in-
depth investigation. Likewise, it is to the advantage of the ISA to
establish such a reputation. The independence requirements
coupled with the liability provisions 129 might be enough to over-
come any pressure to do less than is required. In line with the
Commission's policy of allowing the parties the maximum possible
freedom, it would seem that private selection of the ISA would be
worth the risk it involves, although the private selection should
be subject to approval by the Commission.
If the Commission should determine, after some experience in
the matter, that the effects of private selection are adverse to the
investor, the selection could be made by the Commission itself.130
If selection is made by the Commission, the ISA would be under
129. See page infra.
130. It is probably preferable that the ISA also be independent of the
Commission. The ISA should not be caught in funding problems,
staff reallocation and other problems that administrative agencies
face. The ISA should also have some latitude to use his or her inde-
pendent judgment, especially in connection with fairness problems.
Moreover, if the ISA were in the employ of the Commission it would
be virtually impossible to counteract the erroneous impression of in-
vestors that the Commission had given its own stamp of approval to
the issue.
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pressure to please the Commission, which pleasure would involve
more vigorous protection of the investor. This method of selection
also has the advantage of giving the Commission more direct and
immediate control in regulating the future of the ISA. Although
this method of selection would involve a considerable grant of dis-
cretion to the Commission, there is no reason to believe that the
Commission would abuse that discretion or would be less than im-
partial in choosing among equally qualified ISA's. A compromise
between Commission selection and private selection might be use-
fully accomplished by means of the Commission putting forward
the names of three ISA's, one of which would be selected by the
parties.
It is inescapable that the parties to the transaction would pay
the ISA fees either directly or indirectly through high filing fees.
This should not compromise the independence of the ISA since he
or she would be entitled to that fee whether the report was favor-
able or unfavorable. The Commission could arbitrate any dispute
between the ISA and the parties. The fee received by the ISA
would be included in the "Expenses of the Offering" section of the
registration statement. The Commission should be suspicious of
fees which appear unduly large and should ask for justification in
those cases. It should also be obvious that the ISA should be al-
lowed to accept no other form of payment or benefit from any of
the parties. In this connection, the ISA should sign an agree-
ment or it should be provided by rule that the ISA will not be al-
lowed to accept employment from any party to the transaction or
its affiliates in a capacity other than ISA for a reasonable period
of time. A period of two years would seem sufficiently long to
assure that the prospect of future employment did not influence
the ISA's decisions.
D. THE STAmAPD OF LiABILITY
One major problem in the implementation of the concept of
the ISA is the standard of liability to which the ISA is to be held.
The dilemma is at once apparent. If the standard of liability is too
vigorous, people may be unwilling to take a job or take it only if
paid a prohibitive fee. Conversely, if the standard is too lax, the
incentive to thoroughly investigate may be reduced and the temp-
tation to give into the pressure applied by the issuer and under-
writer might have more of an effect. The protection offered to the
public would be proportionately reduced.
The solution lies, as it usually does, between these two ex-
tremes. The standard set by section 11 for "experts" would seem,
by analogy, to be appropriate. Section 11 provides the expert with
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a defense to liability if after reasonable investigation he or she did
not know and had no reason to know of the misstatement or
omission. The reasonable investigation, in this case, would be an
investigation which complied with the requirements for an ISA
investigation. However, section 11 makes an expert jointly and
severally liable for the entire amount of the investor loss. If the
ISA is chosen by the Commission and the incentive to perform a
thorough and competent investigation is greater, this standard is
too extreme. The liability should be limited to a reasonable
amount although an amount which would provide a healthy in-
centive for a thorough and competent investigation.
The ISA who is confident that he or she can perform a compe-
tent investigation should not be deterred by this standard. Mal-
practice insurance, however, should be made available on the same
basis that it is made available to accountants and lawyers.
It would seem that the second most effective safeguard against
an inadequate investigation would be to set out as clearly as possi-
ble the standards of the investigation and require that the report
of the investigation forwarded to the Commission contain a step-
by-step documentation of the work done and the conclusions drawn
therefrom. The lines of investigation should parallel the pri-
mary disclosure and investigative requirements proposed by the
NASD. The Commission should require by rule exactly how the
investigation should proceed. The rules should be particularly
explicit with regard to the use of questionnaires, actual physi-
cal verification, and use of certain additional exploratory pro-
cedures triggered by certain findings.
The most effective method of assuring a thorough investiga-
tion would be to give the ISA an incentive to uncover something.
The lawyers have the "stick" behind them, but they have no in-
centive other than their professional pride-the value of which
should not be minimized-to really come up with "something"
about their own client. They have, on the other hand, the hope
of being rehired by the issuer or underwriter or a continuing rela-
tionship and therefore have an incentive, though hopefully not one
which often will overcome their professional judgment, to not find
anything more than they have to find. The same is true of the ac-
countants. If the Commission were to select the ISA it might
choose on the basis of the thoroughness of past investigations.
Although some might argue that this would cause the ISA to be
too picky, this is clearly a case where too much is better than too
little if one must choose between the two. If the ISA is selected
privately, that incentive would not be present. Because of this and
other factors, the Commission should not hesitate to bring the se-
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lection process under its control if it appears that the quality of
investigation is not a satisfactory implementation of the ISA con-
cept.
E. ImPLEMENTATION UNDER THE Federal Securities Code
If it saw fit, the Commission would have the power, within the
limits of the Administration Procedure Act, to promulgate im-
mediately a rule requiring the ISA report as a necessary "expert"
report to be included in the registration statement or to set up
standards for the ISA. Obviously, however, such a change should
be made only after careful and lengthy consideration. Much of
the change is significant enough that it should be made at the
legislative rather than the administrative level.
A major pre-legislation effort is presently well underway in
the securities field. This effort is embodied in the new Federal
Securities Code. The Code, which would integrate the "scattera-
tion' 3'z of the various securities laws, would require the regis-
tration of companies as opposed to the registration of a particular
issue of the companies' securities. The company would be required
to register when it first distributed its securities, 32 or when it at-
tained one million dollars in gross assets and three hundred stock-
holders.1 33 This registration process would be accomplished by the
filing of a registration statement that probably would be similar to
the present Form 10. Information in the registration statement
would be updated periodically. Later sales of securities by the
issuer would require the filing and circulation of an offering
statement which would contain the Prospectus and would be the
counterpart to the present registration statement 3 4 required
under the 1933 Act. The information contained in the offering
statement would supplement rather than duplicate the informa-
tion contained in the Code's registration statement. A "sale"
would include the exchange of securities in connection with a
merger or sale of assets. 35
131. ALI FED. SEc. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2 1973) (Introductory memo).
See Loss & Blackstone, Codification of the Federal Securities Laws
28 Bus. LAw. 381 (1973).
132. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 501 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
133. Id. § 401(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). The issuer would also be
permitted to register voluntarily. Id. § 401(b). The registration
would continue under the registration reporting and other require-
ments until, basically, ninety days after the end of the fiscal year
in which the number of shareholders fell to less than one hundred.
Id. § 405.
134. Id. §§ 501(a), (c).
135. Id. § 296A.
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If a person other than the issuer, a "secondary distributor,"
wishes to sell more than $100,000 of the security,136 and if the is-
suer is a "one year registrant",137 that person may offer and sell
the securities if the secondary distributor files a distribution state-
ment. 38 Similarly, any person, including the issuer, who solicits
a proxy, subject to certain exemptions, must file a proxy state-
ment. 139 And, also subject to certain exemptions, a person who
makes a "tender request"' 40 must also file a statement.1 4 1 These
statements filed by persons other than the issuer would give the
details of the transaction. Information about the issuer would be
contained in the registration statement.
The concept of the ISA would fit in easily with the Code.
The ISA investigation report could be required to be included
in the registration statement. As the registration statement is to
be the central, primary disclosure document and will serve as the
"foundation" document for several other transactions, it is cru-
cial that the information contained in the registration statement
be as accurate and complete as possible. This is especially true in
the case of a registration statement filed in connection with a
first-time public offering. A thorough investigation would do
much to assure that all material information has been disclosed to
the investor and would also serve as a solid base for future dis-
closures to build upon.
Borrowing the similar provision of the English City Code, where
the offering involves a merger, or what amounts to a merger, which
is not completely at arm's length, an ISA report on the fairness
of the transaction might also be required. 14 2
Substantive merger requirements and fairness problems have
traditionally been in the province of state rather than federal leg-
islation. However, where the merger affects two or more cor-
porations in different states with shareholders in many other
states, it would seem that federal legislation is preferable. An ex-
emption from the federal requirements might be allowed where the
corporate parties to the transaction are subject to control by the
136. Id. § 511(d).
137. Id. § 270.
138. Id. § 509.
139. Id. § 602.
140. Id. § 299.9.
141. Id. § 605.
142. The ISA fairness report would give a court deciding upon the fairness
of the merger price a very useful independent evaluation. Because
the report if it concludes that the price is not fair would include
an estimate of what a fair price would be, it would eliminate some
of the uncertainty faced by those dissenting shareholders contem-
TRUTH IN SECURITIES
same state and a great majority of the stockholders of those corpora-
tions are in the same state.
The Commission under Section 302 of the Code would have the
power to exempt anything from any requirement. The Commis-
sion could use this power to further tailor the use of the ISA to
provide verified information. The Commission could decide which,
if any, of the periodic reports should include verified information.
A less intensive investigation might be required for those com-
panies with which the Commission has had longer favorable ex-
perience.
The ISA might prove useful in other ways. The Code would do
away with the esoteric and unpredictable self-protection stand-
ards1 43 which now control whether an offering comes within the
non-public offering exemption from registration. 14 4  The Code
would require only that there be thirty-five or less non-institu-
tional purchasers (there may be an infinite number of offerees)
and that there be no general advertising. 45 The Code would per-
mit within this "limited offering" exemption sales to any num-
ber of institutional purchasers. 1 46 In these cases, under certain
conditions, the state may wish to require filing of a modified form
of the ISA report. The price of certainty here is that the initial dis-
closure may suffer and the investor will have to rely on the fraud
provisions. This cost may be lessened somewhat by requiring a
modified form of an ISA investigation when the proceeds of the of-
fering are above a certain amount and the sales are made to per-
sons "outside" the corporation other than institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
The protection of the investor and the prevention of fraud pres-
ently rest largely upon the conscience of the issuer and the under-
writer and the deterrent effects of the securities laws. While in
many cases this will be enough, the value in any particular case
will be uncertain. Providing verified information would provide
extra protection in improving the quality and reliability of the dis-
closures and also act as a deterrent to the making of false or mis-
plating suit for appraisal rights. Where the ISA finds that the terms
are fair it would discourage suits and where the ISA finds the terms
unfair it would be a signal which would encourage action. This
should act as an incentive to management to propose fair terms, or if
the original terms are unfair, to revise them.
143. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
144. 1933 Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
145. ALI FED. S c. Co E § 227 (b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
146. Id.
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leading statements in the first place. The accountant will verify
only so much of the information provided in the registration state-
ment or other disclosure document. As to the rest, neither the
Commission nor the lawyers are in a position to effectively investi-
gate.
The verification of information, however, is the key to the pre-
vention of fraud. This requires an investigation. If the investi-
gation is to be made at all, its value to the investor should be max-
imized while at the same time, if possible, minimizing its cost to the
issuer and underwriter. A single, thorough investigation per-
formed by a competent and independent person would maximize
the value of the investigation to the investor. The efficient di-
vision of labor, the elimination of needless duplication, and the
other benefits of the ISA concept would reduce the cost of this
protection at least to acceptable levels if not below the present
cost of full compliance.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED ARTICLE III, SECTION 35 OF RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE
CONCERNING UNDERWRITER INQUIRY AND INVESTIGATION
STANDARDS RESPECTING DISTRIBUTIONS OF ISSUES
OF SECURITIES TO THE PUBLIC
Obligation ±o Establish and Maintain Written Procedures
(a) Every member engaged in investment banking activity as a man-
aging underwriter shall establish and maintain written procedures which
shall be followed by it in its inquiry and investigation of any issuer for
whom it is acting in connection with the distribution of an issue of securi-
ties to the public. Such procedures shall include, but not necessarily be
limited to, the following:
(1) Review by underwriters' counsel of the issuer's corporate
charter, by-laws, and corporate minutes;
(2) Examination of the audited and unaudited financial state-
ments of the issuer, including footnotes, for the preceding
ten year period or for the entire period of the issuer's exis-
tence if less than ten years;
(3) Review of all changes in auditors by the issuer within the
preceding ten year period if applicable and the reasons
therefor;
(4) Review, with the issuer's auditors, of the financial state-
merits which will appear in the prospectus or offering cir-
cular;
(5) Review of the issuer's budgets, budgeting procedures, and
order/backlog figures;
(6) Review of internal projects of the issuer, including the in-
tended use of the proceedings of the offering;
(7) Review of all pertinent marketing, scientific and/or engi-
neering studies or reports concerning the issuer or its prod-
ucts during the previous ten year period or for the term of
the issuer's existence if less than ten years;
(8) Consideration as to the necessity of third party review of ap-
propriate portions of the inquiry if the issuer is a promo-
tional organization or engaged in marketing high tech-
nology or previously unmarketed products;
(9) Investigation of the issuer's current and past relationships
with banks, creditors, suppliers, competitors and trade as-
sociations;
(10) Communication with key company officials and appropriate
marketing and operating personnel regarding the nature of
the issuer's business and the role of each of the above indi-
viduals in the business operation;
(11) Inspection of the issuer's property, plant and equipment;
(12) Examination of business protection devices and related data
such as trademarks, patents, copyrights and production ob-
solescence, among others;
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(13) Review of available information with respect to the issuer's
position within its industry;
(14) Review of pertinent management techniques, organization
of management and the background of the management per-
sonnel of the issuer;
(15) Preparation and maintenance of memoranda pertaining to all
meetings and/or conversations regarding the issuer held
during the member's performance by it of its obligation of
adequate inquiry;
(16) Tax-Sheliered Program-In addition to the above, when
considered appropriate, written procedures relating to in-
quiry and investigation of tax-sheltered programs shall in-
clude but not necessarily be limited to, the following:
(i) Investigation to determine that the management of
a tax-sheltered investment program has experience
and a working knowledge of tax-sheltered invest-
ments sufficient for the proper handling of invest-
ment monies and the maintenance of the tax-shel-
tered program.
(ii) Physical inspection of all properties described in the
prospectus as being acquired by the tax-sheltered
program, a review of all documents pertaining to
such acquisitions and an examination of the facilities
of any servicing function performed by the tax-shel-
tered management, if any.
(iii) Examination of applicable partnership agreements.
(iv) Review of available information with respect to the
issuer's position within its industry including:
(i) Examination for proper disclosure of all con-
flicts of interest of the sponsor of the tax-shel-
tered program; and
(ii) Examination of all records submitted by ap-
praisers, engineers, financial consultants, and
other independent consultants with empha-
sis respecting the procedures utilized in the
formulation of their analysis of the tax-shel-
tered investment, and study of all tax aspects
of the tax-sheltered program to insure that the
described or anticipated tax benefits will, in
fact, accrue to the investor.
Obligation of Inquiry and Investigations in Issuer
Distributed Offerings of Tax-Sheltered Programs
(b) At least one member participating in the distribution to the pub-
lic of an issue of securities for which there is no managing under-
writer must assume the obligation of establishing, maintaining and fol-
lowing written procedures concerning inquiry and investigation of the is-
suer as delineated in paragraph (a) hereof and those obligation of certifi-
cation and record keeping contained in paragraphs (c) and (d) hereof.
Certification as to Adequate Inquiry
(c) On or prior to the effective date of the distribution of an issue of
securities to the public, the managing underwriter shall certify in the
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agreement among underwriters that it had established adequate inquiry
procedures in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) hereof,
and that in respect to the underwriting which is the subject of the agree-
ment, it had followed procedures thus established. In the event there is
no agreement among underwriters, the said certification shall be made to
all selling group members. If there is no selling group, or if the required
inquiry and investigation is performed by a member subject to the pro-
visions of paragraph (b), the certification shall be made in the prospec-
tus.
Maintenance and Retention of Written Documentation
(d) Every member subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) or (b)
hereof shall keep and preserve appropriate written documentation demon-
strating compliance with paragraphs (a) and (c) hereof. These records
shall be preserved for a period of not less than five years, the first two
years in an easily accessible place.
Definitions
i) "Investment Banking Activity"-shall mean the business carried
on by a member of underwriting or distributing issues of securities for
which documents and other information are required to be filed with the
Association pursuant to the provisions of the Interpretation of the Board
of Governors Concerning the Review of Corporate Financing.
(ii) '"Managing Underwriter"-for purposes of this Section 35 shall,
where necessary in view of the context within which it is used, mean
that member originating the distribution and/or the primary distributor
of the issue in question, or the member who made the required filing
with the Association pursuant to the provisions of the Interpretation of
the Board of Governors Concerning the Review of Corporate Financing.
(iii) 'Prospectus"-shall have the meaning given to that term by Sec-
tion 2(10) of the Securities Act of 1933; provided, however, that such
term as used herein shall also include an offering circular filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Rule 256 of the General
Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933 and, in the case of
an intrastate offering, any document, by whatever name known, filed and/or
distributed as part of the registration or similar process by whatever
name known for an issue of securities pursuant to the laws or regulations
of any state.
(iv) "Tax Sheltered Program"-a program which provides for flow-
through tax benefits regardless of the structure of the legal entity or vehi-
cle for distribution including, but not limited to, oil and gas programs, real
estate syndications (except real estate investment trusts), citrus grove de-
velopments, cattle programs and all other programs of a similar nature,
regardless of the industry represented by the program, or any combination
thereof.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SCHEDULE "C" OF ARTICLE I,
SECTION 2 (d) OF THE ASSOCIATION'S BY-LAWS
(4) Registration of Qualified Underwriter Principal
(a) New Members
(i) Effective , every applicant for membership who
intends to engage in investment banking activity shall designate with the
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corporation at least one person as a Qualified Underwriter Principal, the
duties of whom shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the organ-
ization and/or supervision of any participation in the origination or distri-
bution of offerings of securities by a member whether as an underwriter
or selling group member.
(ii) Before a member may engage in investment banking activ-
ity, the designated Qualified Underwriter Principal shall successfully com-
plete Parts I and III of a three-part Qualification Examination for Princi-
pals. If a person is qualified to be registered as a principal pursuant to
Part I hereof, such individual shall be required to pass only Part Il of
the Qualification Examination for Principals.
(iii) Only those persons who have three years of experience with
a member actively engaged in the origination of the underwriting of offer-
ings of securities and who can demonstrate that a significant part of their
individual business experience with the member entailed involvement with
investment banking activities may be designated and qualified as a Qual-
ified Underwriter Principal. In an exceptional case, when the business
background and experience of the designated individual justifies such, the
experience requirement imposed herein may be waived by the President of
the corporation upon written request of the designated Qualified Under-
writer Principal. In all such cases the burden of justification for such
waiver shall be upon the applicant.
(b) Existing Members
(i) Every member of the corporation engaged in investment
banking activity shall as of designate at least one person as
a Qualified Underwriter Principal whose duties shall include, but not nec-
essarily be limited to, the organization and/or supervision of any partici-
pation in the origination and distribution of offerings of securities by a
member whether as an underwriter or selling group member. Except as
otherwise provided in subparagraph (iv) herein, such person shall be re-
quired to take and successfully pass Parts I and III of the three-part Qual-
ification Examination for Principals.
(ii) Every person becoming registered as a principal after
whose duties do or will involve the organization and/or supervision of any
participation in the origination or distribution of offerings of securities by
a member whether as an underwriter or selling group member shall be
designated a Qualified Underwriter Principal. All persons so designated
shall be required to pass Parts I and III of the three-part Qualification
Examination for Principals.
(iii) Any registered principal whose duties with a member are
changed after to involve the oganization and/or supervision of
any participation in the origination or distribution of offerings of securities
by a member whether as an underwriter or selling group member, shall be
designated a Qualified Underwriter Principal and shall be required to pass
Part III of a three-part Qualification Examination for Principals unless such
individual is exempt from such requirement in accordance with the provi-
sion of subsection (iv) herein.
(iv) Any person designated as a Qualified Underwriter Princi-
pal who has been registered with a member or members as a principal for
a period of at least three years prior to and who was actively
engaged in the origination of underwriting issues of securities shall not be
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required to take Part III of the three-part Qualification Examination for
Principals. A registered principal who does not meet the stated experience
requirement may be registered with the corporation as a Qualified Under-
writer Principal upon passing Part III of the Qualification Examination for
Principals.
(v) A principal whose registration has been terminated for a
period of two years or more immediately preceding the filing of an appli-
cation for Qualified Underwriter Principal may not engage in the organ-
ization and/or supervision of any participation in the origination or distri-
bution of an offering of securities until he has passed Part III of the Qual-
ification Examination for Principals notwithstanding the length of his pre-
vious experience in investment banking activity.
(c) Prohibition
(i) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, any officer, director, general partner, owner of 10 percentum or
more of the voting securities, or controlling person of any broker or dealer
for whom a trustee has been or is hereafter appointed pursuant to the
provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 may not engage
in the organization and/or supervision of any participation in the origina-
tion or distribution of an offering of securities after unless
such individual subsequent to the appointment of the trustee takes and
successfully completes Part III of the Qualification Examination for Prin-
cipals.
